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I. INTRODUCTION
At the base of mortgage law is the Equity of Redemption.1 This is a
common law right, which developed in England centuries ago,2 and is part of the
law the colonists brought over to America. The equity of redemption allows a
mortgagor a period of time after he defaults within which to pay off the loan and
not lose the property3 or—perhaps more importantly—any equity the mortgagor
* Juris Doctorate Candidate, 2015, Pepperdine University School of Law. Rabbinical Ordination
received 2010, Yeshiva Centre of Sydney.
1
See GRANT S. NELSON, DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHART & R. WILSON FREYERMUTH,
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT CASES AND MATERIALS 112–15 (8th ed.
2009) (discussing the evolution of the modern mortgage arrangement and the introduction of
equitable principles into the real estate transaction).
2
Id.
3
Id. Foreclosure is the actual time of cutting off the equity of redemption. Id. Before the
concept of a foreclosure sale was introduced, the common law mortgages included a date for
repayment called “law day.” Id. If the mortgagor could not pay off the debt on that day he would
forfeit all his interests in the property to the mortgagee, even if the only reason for the mortgagor’s
inability to pay was his inability to find the mortgagor on that day. Id. The English Chancery courts
established the concept of a right of the mortgagor to a tardy redemption of the property, which
became the source of the equity of redemption. Id. Foreclosure was then instituted to allow the
mortgagee to go into court and establish a date on which the mortgagee’s right of redemption would
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owns in the property.4 During this period of time between default and the
foreclosure sale, which eventually developed from a “strict foreclosure,” the
lender is losing equity in the property.5 The relatively small per-transaction
amount of equity the lender loses in cases of default on residential property can
be justified by the competing policy goal of allowing homeowners an extra
chance to keep their property. However, in bigger commercial mortgages—
where the property is not a homestead—those policy concerns are not as great,
and there is less justification for a long delay between default and the
foreclosure sale. Moreover, the potential monetary losses to the mortgagee in
the period between default and foreclosure sale are much larger in commercial
mortgages than they are in residential loans for smaller amounts of money.6
Ancillary remedies were developed by the law to protect lenders during
the period between default and foreclosure sale and, consequently, encouraged
lenders to make such loans.7 The ancillary remedies available to a lender after

be cut off. Id. Later evolution of foreclosure led to the advent of the foreclosure sale. Id.
4
“Equity” is defined as “the value of a piece of property (such as a house) after any debts that
remain to be paid for it (such as the amount of a mortgage) have been subtracted.” Equity
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/equity
(last visited Oct. 26, 2014). This means, if a mortgagor defaults on a $100,000 loan secured by a
mortgage on a $200,000 property, the mortgagor owns $100,000 of equity in his property. See
generally NELSON ET AL., supra note 1. Under the old English rules of law day or even under strict
foreclosure, any equity the mortgagor owned in the property would be forfeited to the mortgagee.
Id. The modern foreclosure sale and right to surplus from the sale was instituted to protect the
mortgagor’s right to his equity in the property. Id.
5
This occurs due to the fact there is typically a long period of time from the mortgagor’s default
on his loan until foreclosure proceedings begin, run their course, and finally conclude with a
foreclosure sale. See Amy Loftsgordon, States With Long Foreclosure timelines, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/states-with-long-foreclosure-timelines.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2014) (saying foreclosures in the first quarter of 2013 took an average of 477 days to
process and mentioning judicial foreclosures—the type of foreclosure this article is primarily
concerned with, because only with a judicial foreclosure are deficiency judgments permitted—take
even longer than that timeframe). During this time, the mortgagor in default typically does not make
payments on the loan, and, in effect, is living on the property rent-free until the foreclosure sale, or
until the end of the statutory redemption period in the states that allow the debtor to retain possession
during that period. See generally NELSON ET AL., supra note 1. The mortgagor is, therefore, taking
equity out of the property equal to the fair rental value of the property during the time he is in
possession without paying. Id.
6
This is simply because the cost of maintaining the property and paying property taxes will be
higher—even if not proportionally higher—than in a residential property. Additionally, commercial
properties generate profits, because even though the owner is in default, he may still have tenants
and favorable leases on the property, and mortgagors in default may be tempted to keep those profits
rather than pay them towards the debt.
7
NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 358. The text explains there are three theories of mortgage:
title theory, lien theory, and the intermediate theory. Id. These three theories explain the nature of
the mortgagee’s interest in the property. Id. Under the title theory, the mortgagee obtains legal title
at the signing of the mortgage; under lien theory legal title may not be passed until foreclosure
occurs. Id. The interest of the mortgagee in the property can affect what manner of ancillary
remedies is available to him in the interim between default and foreclosure sale. Id. Under title
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the mortgagor defaults are: (1) possession;8 (2) assignment of rents agreements;9
and (3) appointment of a receiver.10 One of the advantages to appointing a
receiver, rather than taking possession of the land or executing an assignment of
the rents agreement, is the receiver acts as an intermediary that insulates the
mortgagee from certain liabilities involved with having possession of the land.11
Another advantage is mortgagees are typically institutional lenders who are not
in the business of managing land,12 and the appointed receiver will generally be
someone more familiar with, and better equipped to perform, the task.13
The mortgages where a receiver will be used are generally recourse
mortgages, meaning a deficiency judgment or personal liability is available to
cover any part of the debt not satisfied by the foreclosure sale.14 However, to
assess personal liability, the foreclosure must be conducted judicially, which
takes even longer than non-judicial foreclosures.15 The receiver’s role is to

theory the mortgagor may be entitled to take possession of the property, though generally not
without some judicial action, while in a lien theory jurisdiction the mortgagee will have to resort to
enforcing an assignment of the rents agreement. Id.
8
Id. at 360.
9
Id. at 372.
10
Id. at 392.
11
See Coleman v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65, 67–70 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing the trial court
ruling for summary judgment on the common law premises liability claim as to Hoffman and
Anderson Hunter and saying, due to the fact they took possession of the property, they were exposed
to premises liability claims stemming from that property); cf. Trustco Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Eakin,
681 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). Receiver is a court officer and not an agent of the
parties, and during the pendency of the receivership the property is in the possession of the court
itself. Id. In this case, poor management and lack of funds with which to manage the property lead
to it depreciating in value during the time of the receivership, but the receiver was immunized from
liability as an officer of the court, and the mortgagee had not taken possession of the property
because the receiver is not his agent and was, therefore, not liable for the depreciation of the land’s
value. Id.
12
See Joaquin Benitez, Foreclosure: The secret the banks don’t want you to know!, TRIBUNA
(July 25, 2013), http://www.tribunact.com/foreclosure/.
13
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 567–68 (West 2012) (stating “The receiver must be sworn
to perform the duties faithfully,” and those powers include “power to bring and defend actions in his
own name, as receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, to
compound for and compromise the same, to make transfers, and generally to do such acts respecting
the property as the [c]ourt may authorize.”).
14
See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 580b(a)(3) (West 2014) (“[N]o deficiency shall be owed or collected,
and no deficiency judgment shall lie, for . . . a deed of trust or mortgage on a dwelling for not more
than four families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan that was used to pay all or part of
the purchase price of that dwelling.”). This statute is representative of the general legislative intent
of specifically providing anti-deficiency protection to residential—consumer—loans, and such laws
are not in place to protect commercial borrowers.
15
See Loftsgordon, supra note 5 (saying this is because a court is “involved in every step of the
foreclosure. As a result, the judicial foreclosure process often takes a lot longer than a non-judicial
one. Backlogged courts, judges’ schedules, hearings, and required paperwork all contribute to a
prolonged process. Courts are simply unable to process a large volume of foreclosures in an
expedited manner.”).
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make sure the profits being generated in the interim between the default and the
foreclosure sale go towards paying down the debt and not towards padding the
mortgagor’s pockets.16 When the mortgage is non-recourse and there can be no
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, a receiver is vital to ensure the
mortgagee can recover as much of the money owed to him as possible.17
The receiver aids that goal by ensuring the profits accruing from the
default until the sale go towards the debt, and the losses suffered by the lender
will be minimalized. The focus of this article is on the abilities of the receiver
and the restrictions put on him regarding his management of the property—
specifically, whether the receiver has the ability to sell the land free and clear of
all liens, and, if so, under what circumstances and by what method.
Part II gives an overview of the article, discusses the structures of
receivership statutes in various jurisdictions, and further discusses receivership
sales.18 Part III analyzes the statutory frameworks and caselaw from a selection
of jurisdictions with regards to their treatment of receiverships and focuses on
sales made by the receiver in the foreclosure context.19 Part IV suggests any
uniform law for sales by receiverships should consist of three elements: (1) the
agreement must be made post-default; (2) there should be an objection system to
protect junior lienholders; and (3) there should be exceptions to protect
homesteads and farm owners.20
II. OVERVIEW AND GOAL OF THE ARTICLE
Every state has its own statutory framework regarding receiverships.21
16
See CIV. PROC. §§ 567–68. Duties of the receiver are tasks pertaining to the goal of directing
profits from the property to the mortgagee that the court appointed the receiver for. Id.
17
While this will not often come up in mortgages for residential properties where there are no
profits being generated that the mortgagee stands to lose, this can occur in other circumstances. A
prime example of an instance where a receiver is vital and the loan is non-recourse is the case of a
commercial property, which is transferred subject to the mortgage i.e., the grantee did not assume
personal liability for the property. In such cases, the grantor/mortgagor is secondarily liable on the
debt and can be found personally liable but will generally not be in a position to pay that debt.
NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 453. If the creditor tries to levy against him, the grantor/mortgagor
will declare bankruptcy. In this case, it is imperative for the mortgagee to stop the grantee from
draining equity from the property and not being personally liable for any deficiencies at the
foreclosure sale. The quick use of a receiver—sometimes ex parte—can put a stop to the grantee’s
equity draining. The practice of taking subject to a mortgage in default, or almost in default, and
diverting profits away from the mortgagee has been criminalized in some jurisdictions as “rent
skimming”. See CIV. PROC. §§ 890–94.
18
See infra Part II and accompanying notes 21–39.
19
See infra Part III and accompanying notes 40–202.
20
See infra Part IV and accompanying notes 203–209.
21
See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 564 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 14.32 (2014); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 576.21 (West 2014); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.60.005 (West 2014).
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These vary as to when and how the receiver is appointed,22 as well as what the
receiver can do to the property,23 and when and to what extent he must report to
the court.24 The focus of this article is on examining various states’ approaches
to receiverships, particularly receivers appointed in the mortgage foreclosure
context. The article will proceed by examining a state’s statutory framework
and will then explore any relevant caselaw.
Receivers selling land free and clear of liens in public or private sales,
depending on the reasonable estimate of the form most likely to bring in the best
value for the land, are a parallel to trustees in a bankruptcy court.25 Trustees
charged with selling the land can do so in any format, subject to approval by a
court, calculated to bring in the most value.26 They are incentivized to execute
the estate to bring in maximum value by tying their compensation to the total
amount of funds they generate for the pool to pay off unsecured creditors.27 A
similar device could be used in the foreclosure receiver context by giving him
multiple options and allowing the receiver to determine which route is likely to
bring the most value to all parties: maintaining the property and collecting rents,
selling the land publicly at an auction, or conducting a private sale, subject to
court approval. The receiver could then be compensated commensurate with
how much value the receivership estate benefited from the property.28

22
See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 564 (West 2014); GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 14.32 (2014); MINN. STAT. §
576.24 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.025 (2014).
23
See, e.g., CIV. PROC. § 568 (West 2014); GEN LAWS ch. 156B § 106 (2014); MINN. STAT. §
576.25(5)(d) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.060 (2014).
24
See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1182 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=three&linkid=rule3_1182; MASS. R. CIV. P. 66
(West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.36 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.100 (2014).
25
See Federal and State Court Receiverships as Alternatives to Bankruptcy – Pros and Cons,
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, http://www.abiworld.org/BestofABI/materials/StateLaw
ReceivershipMemo.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) (“The general receiver is analogous
to a bankruptcy trustee [because] the receiver controls all the assets and operates the businesses with
the intent to either sell such assets as a going concern or liquidate the assets of the business. In
either case, the receiver disburses the proceeds to the creditors according to the priority of their
interests.”).
26
11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other
than in the ordinary course of business. . . . The trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.”).
27
Id. § 326(a) (“In a case under chapter 7 or 11, the court may allow reasonable compensation
. . . of the trustee for the trustee’s services . . . not to exceed 25 percent on the first $5,000 or less, 10
percent on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess of $50,000, 5 percent on any amount in
excess of $50,000 but not in excess of $1,000,000, and reasonable compensation not to exceed 3
percent of such moneys in excess of $1,000,000, upon all moneys disbursed or turned over in the
case by the trustee to parties in interest, excluding the debtor, but including holders of secured
claims.”).
28
This could be measured by percentage of rents or in the case of a sale perhaps calculated as
percentage of amount gained above the reasonable expected sale price at foreclosure, including the
losses from waiting that long, and court and other procedural fees.
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A receiver that is empowered to sell land free and clear of liens can pursue
potential buyers with all the tools used in conventional land sales.29 In
conventional real estate sales, the seller can shop the property to find the best
price. If an acceptable offer is not made, the seller has the luxury of not making
the sale. The current state of foreclosure sales, as well as receiver sales in some
states, requires an auction.30 The bidding is intended to bring about a good price
through competition, but, in reality, this is not necessarily true.31 This is due to
the fact there must be a sale at the end of the auction day, regardless of whether
any good offers were made.32 A receiver sale in which the receiver may act as a
real estate agent would bring about a higher sales price.33 This is a benefit to
29
Patrick Mears & Dustin Daniels, Sales of Receivership Assets Free and Clear of Liens and
Interests, 38 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 112 (2011). When a receiver is restricted to sales by public
auction, the sale price is capped at the amount the highest bidder present at the auction will bid. This
can lead to property being sold at a discount because the seller has given up the valuable negotiating
ability of being able to walk away. A more common approach to selling real estate is the use of
agents and brokers who actively seek out the best buyer for the particular property, rather than
posting notice for an auction and hoping the right buyer bids at the right price. When the receiver is
able to sell in this manner, he is better able to get more value for the property. Another difference
between the conventional sale for land and sales by a receiver is, while most homes for sale are sold
free and clear of liens and include a deed with an implied warranty of good title, oftentimes the
property held by the receiver is subject to multiple liens, including junior mortgage holders and
judgment lienholders. Even when the purchase price of the property is discounted to account for
junior liens on the property, the very existence of those interests harms the value of the property
because buyers are hesitant to purchase land subject to imminent foreclosure and due to the “first in
time first in priority” principle, buyers of land subject to liens will have a more difficult time finding
new financing. Allowing receivers to sell property free and clear of liens can give the receiver a
more marketable asset with more willing buyers, and, thus, lead to a higher purchase price. Those
liens would be converted into unsecured claims on the mortgagor with a priority interest on the
proceeds of the sale of the property. The higher price from the sale of the property, due to its
increased marketability and clean title, ultimately benefits the junior interests because it is likely
there will be more money when the sale is conducted by conventional means. And, if the
foreclosure would have run its course and ended in a regular foreclosure sale, the junior interests
would not have been better off, because their claims would be wiped out after the foreclosure sale, to
satisfy the senior interests.
30
See NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at Chapter 6.
31
See, e.g., Baskurt v. Beal, 101 P.3d 1041, 1042–43 (Alaska 2004). In this case, the property
value was at least above $100,000, and perhaps worth double that amount. Id. at 1042. But, due to
the manner of the sale—a foreclosure auction sale—the price was limited to the most anyone present
would be willing to pay. Id. In this case, Baskurt made the opening and only bid for $26,781.81, a
dollar over the remaining debt owed on the property, on behalf of the partnership. Id. at 1043.
There were no other bids, and the property was sold to Baskurt, Joyce, and Rosenthal via a trustee’s
deed. Id. The sale in this case was voidable but not because of the low purchase price. Id. at 1044–
46.
32
See by Andrew Latham, Foreclosure Auction Rules, SFGATE,
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/foreclosure-auction-rules-1383.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
33
See Yuen Leng Chow, Isa Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, Auction versus Negotiated Sale:
Evidence from Real Estate Sales, ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Feb. 8, 2011), http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2437&context=tepper (discussing situations in which auctions can bring in
higher sales prices than traditional real estate broker sales). But, it is important the receiver have the
ability to use whichever method of sale is reasonably calculated to realize the most value from the
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both the mortgagee and mortgagor. It would also be a faster and more efficient
process than the standard public sale in a foreclosure, because the receiver is
appointed soon after default and could begin selling the property, if that is
determined to be the best course of action, immediately, rather than waiting the
months or years until the foreclosure sale.
The arguments against a receiver selling free and clear of liens is the
mortgagor will lose his right to statutory redemption, in the states in which there
is such a right,34 and, more importantly, sales by a receiver can be seen as a way
of circumventing the foreclosure process and being a clog on the equity of
redemption. A clog on the equity of redemption can be anything that takes away
the mortgagor’s rights to late payment, after default, before the mortgagee
completes all foreclosure proceedings, which now includes a foreclosure sale.35
Clogs on the equity of redemption are not allowed in any jurisdiction in the
United States or the United Kingdom, among many others.36 But, the issue of
sales by receivers being a clog on the equity of redemption only arises when the
agreement to allow such sales is made ex ante37—that is, the agreement is in the
original mortgage note or was agreed to before the mortgagor defaulted.38
Similar agreements made ex post—“work-out” agreements after a default—can
shortcut the foreclosure process, if the mortgagor defaults again or fails to meet
property. Id. When the receiver is free to determine whether this property is of a heterogeneous
nature and will be well served by a public auction, or if the property is not highly in demand or
unique and will be best served by carefully seeking out the right buyer, then the receiver has the
proper tools to maximize the property’s value. Id.
34
See generally Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the
Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 589 (2010) (“In almost
half of the states the foreclosure sale is not the end of the road for the borrower. A concept
commonly termed ‘statutory redemption’ allows the mortgagor-debtor and, in many instances, junior
lienholders, up to a year or longer to regain title after the foreclosure sale by paying the foreclosure
purchaser the sale price plus accrued interest and other expenses.”).
35
See NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at chapter 3.
36
See id. at 115–16 (discussing several forms of mortgage substitutes that developed over time
as ways to circumvent the clogging the equity of redemption doctrine). If the clog on the equity is
obvious and poorly concealed by the particular device, the court may allow parole evidence to show
the device is in fact a mortgage and should be treated as such. The installment land contract is a rare
case of a mortgage substitute that is not fully under mortgage law. Id; see also id. at 272 (discussing
the same concepts of clogs on the equity of redemption in more depth).
37
Id. at 272. “For centuries it has been the rule that a mortgagor’s equity of redemption cannot
be clogged and that he cannot, as a part of the original mortgage transaction, cut off or surrender his
right to redeem. Any agreement which does so is void and unenforceable as against public policy.”
Id; see also id. at 272–73 (quoting 4 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
1193, at 568 et seq. (5th ed. 1941)) (“[I]f the instrument is in its essence a mortgage . . . the debtor or
mortgagor cannot, in the inception if the instrument . . . in any manner deprive himself of his
equitable right to come after default . . . to redeem the land from the lien and encumbrance of the
mortgage; the equitable right of redemption, after a default is preserved, remains in full force, and
will be protected and enforced by a court of equity, no matter what stipulations the parties may have
made in the original transaction purporting to cut off this right.”).
38
See NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 272.
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some other provision of the work-out agreement, without being a clog on the
equity of redemption.39
III. SURVEY OF RECEIVERSHIP STATUTORY AND CASELAW FRAMEWORKS
As the law developed, many areas of law were codified by legislature,
either on a state-by-state basis or at the federal level. Real property law,
however, has been ruled, to a large extent, by the common law doctrines and
legal traditions that were developed over centuries. Real property has been
treated separately from personal property to a point where the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), one of the few examples of property law that has
been uniformly adopted by the states, excludes real property security interests
from its article nine code of secured transactions.40 The UCC goes so far in its
exclusion of real property from article nine that even rents, which are arguably
like any other accounts receivable, are excluded from the UCC if they derive
from the use of land.41 Due to this general hesitance to enact sweeping
legislation on real property, there are few national laws pertaining to real
property.42 And, even on a more local level, a lot of discretion is left to the
courts.43
The statutory framework for some states is silent on the subject of

39

See id. at 277. (“The ‘anti-clogging’ doctrine is generally inapplicable to transactions that are
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage.”).
40
UCC § 9-109.
41
See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the Bankruptcy
Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1512
(1993) (examining the UCC approach to rents as being real property as well as the land versus
services distinction that determines whether the particular rents are controlled by article nine).
42
For example, the masterfully crafted Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act has not been
adopted by a single state.
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Nonjudicial%20Foreclosure%20Act (last visited Dec.
18, 2014). Another example is the Uniform Assignment of rents clause, which is viewed as a very
successful real property uniform law despite it being adopted in (what would be considered in other
contexts) a paltry five states, not including Massachusetts who introduced it in 2014, since its
introduction in 2005. Assignment of Rents Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.
org/Act.aspx?title=Assignment%20of%20Rents%20Act (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
43
See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.031(5) (West 2014) (“Perform other acts
in regard to the property as authorized by the court.”). See generally 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS,
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY § 111 (4th ed. 2001) (“The distinction between real
and personal property is still drawn in the United States in the light of the historical past, and real
property continues to be defined as a freehold interest in land. But, because tenures have been
largely abolished by statutes declaring all land to be allodial, and in jurisdictions in which tenures
may be said to have survived the only remaining incident of tenure is escheat, the distinction
between real and personal property has lost most of its original significance. In contemporary
American practice, therefore, distinction is made between land and movables, and modern treatises
of property law include consideration of both elements of wealth.”).
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receiverships in the mortgage and foreclosure context.44 Many others use a
general “skeleton” set of guidelines for receivers and leave the details to
common law and the court system.45 This approach emphasizes the receiver is
an agent of the court and, thus, can do “such other duties respecting the property
as authorized by the court,”46 or “generally to do such acts respecting the
property as the court may authorize.”47 With this overly generalized charge, the
legislature allows caselaw to determine the exact contours of the receiver’s
powers.
There are, however, some states whose statutes address this topic in more
depth,48 and there are federal statutes that apply to specific types of land.49
A. Federal Statutory Framework
Federal laws about receiverships and receivers’ abilities are discussed in
the context of prejudgment remedies under Chapter 176, Federal Debt

44
See ALASKA STAT. § 09.40.240 (2014) (“A receiver may be appointed by the court in any
action or proceeding . . . when the party’s right to the property that is the subject of the action or
proceeding and that is in the possession of an adverse party is probable, and where it is shown that
the property or its rents or profits are in danger of being lost or materially injured or impaired.”). In
the case of Alaska’s statutory framework, the application of receiverships to foreclosure proceedings
is not clearly spelled out.
45
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 568 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 8-605 (2014); IND.
CODE § 32-30-5-7 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1302 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.600
(West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-302 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-10-04 (2014); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.04 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1554 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
21-21-9 (2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-33-104 (West 2014).
46
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 66(c) (2014).
47
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.600; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-10-04; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-33104.
48
See MINN. STAT. § 576.24 (2014) (establishing there are two kinds of receiverships and “[a]
receivership may be either a limited receivership or a general receivership. Any receivership that is
based upon the enforcement of an assignment of rents or leases, or the foreclosure of a mortgage
lien, judgment lien, mechanic’s lien, or other lien pursuant to which the respondent or any holder of
a lien would have a statutory right of redemption, shall be a limited receivership . . . a receiver may
have control over all the property of the respondent. At any time, the court may order a general
receivership to be converted to a limited receivership and a limited receivership to be converted to a
general receivership.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.015 (2014) (establishing two types of receivership:
“A receiver must be either a general receiver or a custodial receiver. A receiver must be a general
receiver if the receiver is appointed to take possession and control of all or substantially all of a
person’s property with authority to liquidate that property . . . . A receiver must be a custodial
receiver if the receiver is appointed to take charge of limited or specific property of a person or is not
given authority to liquidate property. . . . When the sole basis for the appointment is the pendency of
an action to foreclose upon a lien against real property . . . the court shall appoint the receiver as a
custodial receiver. The court by order may convert either a general receivership or a custodial
receivership into the other.”); Id. § 7.60.260 (allowing a receiver to make sales free and clear of
liens).
49
28 U.S.C. §§ 3103, 2001 (2012).
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Collection Procedure.50 In Section 3103, the statute grants the receiver the
ability to “sell pursuant to section 3007 such real and personal property as the
court shall direct.”51 Section 3007 says the motion to sell the property may be
initiated by the court itself or by either party.52 The statute lays out two
guidelines as to the authority to sell perishable personal property.53 First, the
property must be “likely to perish, waste, or be destroyed, or otherwise
substantially decrease in value during the pendency of the proceeding.”54
Secondly, if the above condition is met, the “court shall order a commercially
reasonable sale of the property.”55
The statute does not define the term “commercially reasonable.” This
grants the court the ability to determine whether the property is properly sold at
a public auction or, if sold in a private sale, the price agreed to is commercially
reasonable.
However, in 28 U.S.C. § 2001 the statute lays out a more detailed
framework for judicial sales of land.56 The statute says property in the
possession of a receiver “shall be sold at public sale in the district wherein any
such receiver was first appointed.”57 The statute also allows a private sale to be
confirmed by the court, “if [the court] finds that the best interests of the estate
will be conserved thereby.”58 The statute further states, before a court may
confirm a private sale, there must be three independent appraisals of the
property to be sold,59 and the court will not confirm any sale for less than two
thirds of the appraised value.60 Additionally, the agreed price for the land to be
sold privately must be advertised for ten days,61 and “[t]he private sale shall not
be confirmed if a bona fide offer is made, under conditions prescribed by the
court, which guarantees at least a [ten] per centum increase over the price
offered in the private sale.”62
It should be noted the federal statutes are not specifically dealing with a
receiver’s sale made during a foreclosure proceeding,63 and it could be argued
any sales during a foreclosure proceeding cut off a bit of the mortgagor’s equity
50

Id. § 3103.
Id. § 3103(b)(1)(B).
52
Id. § 3007(a).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. § 2001. This section is under Chapter 127, Executions and Judicial Sales.
57
Id. § 2001(a).
58
Id. § 2001(b).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
These statutes are under the chapter dealing with judicial proceedings generally and
executions and judicial sales generally. Id. §§ 1961–1964; see also id. §§ 2001–2007.
51
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of redemption. Nevertheless, these statutes give a clear picture of how the
United States Code deals with the sales of property during pending judicial
actions generally,64 and the additional laws that are in force when dealing with
real property.65
B. California
Under the California statutes, a receiver can be appointed in the mortgage
foreclosure context, “where it appears that the property is in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the deed of trust or
mortgage has not been performed, and that the property is probably insufficient
to discharge the deed of trust or mortgage debt.”66 When describing the
receiver’s powers, the California statute details the basic duties of a receiver,
including possession, receiving rents, and collecting debts.67 The statute goes on
to include the catchall provision granting the receiver the additional power
“generally to do such acts respecting the property as the [c]ourt may
authorize.”68
In addition to this statute though, California has statutes detailing the sale
of the property of a judgment creditor.69 The statutes detail the notice
requirements,70 including”:
[A notice to] all persons having liens on the real property on the date
of levy that are of record in the office of the county recorder and
shall instruct the levying officer to mail notice of sale to each such
person at the address used by the county recorder for the return of
the instrument creating the person’s lien after recording. The
levying officer shall mail notice to each such person, at the address
given in the instructions, not less than [twenty] days before the date
of sale.71
The statutes require sales to satisfy a judgment debtor be made in the form
of a public auction and sold to the highest bidder.72 The California statute
specifically mentions such a sale extinguishes all subordinate liens on the
64

See supra note 49.
28 U.S.C. § 3007 (2012).
66
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 564(b)(2) (West 2014).
67
Id. § 568.
68
Id.
69
Id. § 568.5 (“A receiver may, pursuant to an order of the court, sell real or personal property
in the receiver’s possession upon the notice and in the manner prescribed by Article 6 [commencing
with Section 701.510] of Chapter 3 of Division 2 of Title 9. The sale is not final until confirmed by
the court.”) (parentheses in original).
70
Id. § 701.540.
71
Id. § 701.540(h).
72
Id. § 701.560.
65
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property.73
In People v. Riverside University,74 LeMoyne S. Badger was appointed as
a receiver during an action brought against Riverside University to enjoin it
from engaging in certain unlawful and fraudulent business practices75:
The receiver was authorized and instructed to take possession of and
preserve and maintain the property, assets[,] and records of the
university; to continue the university in operation by employing such
persons as may be necessary to conduct regular courses of
instruction and to pay for their services at ordinary and usual rates
from funds that shall come into his possession as receiver; ‘to do all
those things and to incur the risks and obligations ordinarily incurred
by owners, managers, and operators of similar educational
institutions, as such receiver, and no such risk or obligations so
incurred shall be the personal risk or obligation of the receiver, but a
risk and obligation of the receivership estate’; to ‘exert every means
possible to ensure that all students currently enrolled in Riverside
University have the opportunity to complete the current quarter
ending about June 30, 1971.’76
The receiver alleged it was necessary to sell certain furniture and
equipment to continue to operate the school.77 He listed everything sold and the
prices received for them, along with an investigation showing they were sold at
fair market value.78 In determining the validity of the receiver’s sales, the court
quoted section 568.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedures saying, “A
receiver may . . . sell real or personal property . . . . The sale shall not be final
until confirmed by the court. Sales made pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to redemption.”79 The court went on to say, even if selling property
would not have fallen under the breadth of his original charge, “an action of a
receiver in equity, though taken without prior court authorization, may be

73
Id. § 701.630 (“If property is sold pursuant to this article, the lien under which it is sold, any
liens subordinate thereto, and any state tax lien [as defined in Section 7162 of the Government Code]
on the property sold are extinguished.”) (parentheses in original).
74
People v. Riverside Univ., 111 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), superseded by statute, CIV.
PROC. §§ 568.5, 704.740, 708.610, 708.620, as recognized in Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v. D &
M Cabinets, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). The statute establishes certain limits on
courts’ ability to authorize a receiver to sell “the interest of a natural person in a dwelling . . . under
this division to enforce a money judgment except pursuant to a court order for sale obtained under
this article and the dwelling exemption shall be determined under this article.” Id. However, the
statute does not reverse the court’s authorization for sale of property not subject to the statutory
homestead procedure. Id.
75
Riverside Univ., 111 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
76
Id. at 71.
77
Id. at 72.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 73.
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ratified by subsequent court approval.”80
The court’s decision in People v. Riverside shows, when a receiver is
tasked with continuing the operation of a business or property, there can be a
broad scope of powers allowed to the receiver.81 The court went so far as to say
“the receiver was entitled to an approval of his account and final discharge,
notwithstanding the fact the sales were not made in the manner provided for
sales on execution.”82
However, this case was not specifically dealing with a receiver taking
possession during a foreclosure proceeding. It is possible courts feel “if no good
reason appears for refusing to confirm a receiver’s sale, such as chilling of bids
or other misconduct or gross inadequacy of price, the sale should be
confirmed,”83 but mortgages and foreclosures bring up the issues of equities of
redemption and clogs on it, as well as further statutory redemptions after the
foreclosure sale is completed.
In Wells Fargo Financial Leasing Inc. v. D & M Cabinets,84 the judgment
creditor foreclosed his judgment lien on the debtor’s owner-occupied dwelling.85
There is a statutory homestead exception when foreclosing a judgment lien on
an owner-occupied dwelling, and the creditor attempted to avoid that statutory
procedure by appointing a receiver and charging him to sell the land to satisfy
the debt.86 While the trial court allowed this, on appeal the court found, “Wells
Fargo moved for appointment of a receiver for the express and limited purpose
of selling the subject property without complying with section 704.740.
Accordingly, [it reversed] the order in its entirety.”87 We may draw a parallel
from Wells Fargo Financial to the topic of equity of redemption. It would
follow from Wells Fargo Financial, if a court found the sole purpose of
appointing a receiver was to sell the property and circumvent the mortgagor’s
rights of equity of redemption and statutory redemption, then the court would
reverse that order. However, if the receiver was appointed for legitimate
reasons, such as maintaining a property that was losing equity or that was
potentially insufficient as security for the loan, and then circumstances after
default mandated a sale by the receiver, the Wells Fargo Financial court may
find the receiver’s actions were proper.88
80

Id. at 74.
Id. at 73.
82
Id. at 75.
83
Id.
84
99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
85
Wells Fargo Fin., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 100–01.
86
Id. at 102–03.
87
Id. at 103.
88
The court in Wells Fargo Financial found the receiver sale was solely a device being used to
circumvent the statute. Id. The court stressed the receiver was appointed “for the sole and limited
purpose of selling the subject property in avoidance of section 704.740.” Id. The sole and limited
81
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C. Minnesota
Under Minnesota statutory framework a receiver is defined as “a person
appointed by the court as the court’s agent, and subject to the court’s direction,
to take possession of, manage, and, if authorized by this chapter or order of the
court, dispose of receivership property.”89 Minnesota law distinguishes two
types of receiverships: “general receivership and [] limited receivership.”90 The
statute spells out “the enforcement of an assignment of rents or leases, or the
foreclosure of a mortgage lien, judgment lien, mechanic’s lien, or other lien
pursuant to which the respondent or any holder of a lien would have a statutory
right of redemption,”91 as examples of when the court will order a limited
receivership.92 If the court order appointing the receiver is silent on which type
of receivership is being established, the default is a limited receivership.93 The
statutes are not clear as to what circumstances would lead to the appointment of
a general receiver, but they do say, “[a]t any time, the court may order a general
receivership to be converted to a limited receivership and a limited receivership
to be converted to a general receivership.”94
The limited receivership is charged with the standard receiver’s powers
including collecting rents and profits, and managing and maintaining the
property.95 The general receiver is granted additional powers, most notably for
the purposes of this article: abilities “to operate any business constituting
receivership property in the ordinary course of the business, including the use,
sale, or lease of property of the business or otherwise constituting receivership
property, and the incurring and payment of expenses of the business or other
receivership property,”96 and “if authorized by an order of the court following
notice and a hearing, to use, improve, sell, or lease receivership property other
than in the ordinary course of business.”97 The court may order the general

purpose of avoiding a statute analysis can be applied in cases where the law a receiver is avoiding is
the common law rule of equity of redemption of mortgages the statutory redemption available in
California as well as some other states. The question left unanswered by the court in Wells Fargo
Financial is whether sales by receivers that are appointed for a different cause—for example, the
maintenance of the asset or property during the pendency of foreclosure proceedings—could be sold
in avoidance of such laws? And, to take the question one step further, would this court allow a
receiver’s sale when the receiver was appointed for dual purposes—to avoid a certain law as well as
for a legitimate reason?
89
MINN. STAT. § 576.21(p) (2014) (internal quotations marks omitted).
90
Id. § 576.24.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. § 576.29, subd. 1(a)(1).
96
Id. § 576.29, subd. 1(b)(4)
97
Id. § 576.29, subd. 1(b)(5)
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receiver’s sale of the receivership property be free and clear of all liens,98 and,
additionally, the court may order the sale be free of the respondent’s rights of
redemption.99
The Minnesota statutory framework explicitly grants large powers of sale
to the court–appointed receivers.100 Under these statutes, a court can convert the
default limited receivership in a mortgage proceeding into a general receivership
and then allow that receiver to sell the receivership property free and clear of
liens.101
In a case heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as early as 1920, the
court upheld a sale by a receiver.102 The court said, “A sale made by a receiver
is a ‘judicial sale.’ In the absence of a statute regulating such sales, the time,
manner, terms of sale, and notice thereof are matters to be determined solely by
the court having jurisdiction over the proceedings and control of the
property.”103 The appellant challenged the sale claiming the receiver did not
observe the notice directions given by the court.104 However, the court ruled it
was a judicial sale and, “in the absence of a statute regulating it, not only were
the time, manner, terms of sale, and notice thereof matters to be determined
solely by the court, but it also had discretionary power to modify the directions
contained in the order appointing the receiver.”105
Under Minnesota law and its interpretation, receiverships are capable of
selling the property in the receivership.106 The statutory framework lays out a
procedure for courts to convert receivers in the mortgage foreclosure setting into
general receivers107 empowered to conduct court ordered sales of the
98
Id. § 576.46, subd. 1(a). This includes all liens with the exception of unpaid real estate tax
liens and liens arising under federal law. Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. §§ 576.29, subd. 1(b)(4)–(5); MINN. STAT. § 576.30, subd. 3 (2014) (“[E]xecution of the
deed by the receiver shall be prima facie evidence of the authority of the receiver to sell and convey
the real property described in the deed. The court may also require a motion for an order for sale of
the real property or a motion for an order confirming sale of the real property.”); Id. § 576.46, subd.
1(a) (“The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of receivership property is free and clear of
all liens . . . and may be free of the rights of redemption of the respondent if the rights of redemption
are receivership property and the rights of redemption of the holders of any liens, regardless of
whether the sale will generate proceeds sufficient to fully satisfy all liens on the property.”).
101
Id. § 576.24.
102
Northland Pine Co. v. Northern Insulating Co., 177 N.W. 635 (Minn. 1920), abrogated by
Hunter v. Anchor Bank, 842 N.W.2d 10, *16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (ruling mortgage defendants’
failure to strictly comply with “foreclosure by advertisement” statute rendered foreclosure sale void).
103
Northland Pine, 177 N.W. at 635.
104
Id. at 636.
105
Id. It should be noted this case has been abrogated with regards to ability to ignore notice
requirements. Inadequate notice may result in a voided sale.
106
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 576.29, subd. 1(b)(5) (2012).
107
See MINN. STAT. § 576.24 (2014). The section states a receiver in a mortgage lien foreclosure
context is a limited receiver but then gives the court permission to “[a]t any time . . . order a general
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receivership property.108 The statutes address the concerns that are unique to
sales of real estate in the mortgage foreclosure context: rights of redemption and
associated clogs on the equity of redemption,109 and the statutory right of
redemption.110 Minnesota Statutes section 576.46, subdivision 1(a)111 addresses
sales free and clear of rights of redemption by requiring those rights to be part of
the receivership property being sold.112 It also allows any owner or lienholder to
object to the sale.113 If a timely objection is filed, the court will determine
whether “the amount likely to be realized from the sale by the objecting person
is less than the objecting person would realize within a reasonable time in the
absence of this sale.”114 This safeguard prevents sales that might be a clog on
the equity of redemption by only allowing sales that are consented to by all
parties post-default.115
The same section provides some extra protection for the farmers and
consumer debtors statutory redemption laws typically seek to protect allowing
them the extra time to possess the land after the foreclosure sale.116 Perhaps to
ensure receivership sales are used in the commercial real estate context, and not
as a method of circumventing statutory redemption periods, Minnesota Statutes
section 576.46, subdivision 1(a)(1) restricts the ability to sell free and clear of
liens when either “the property is (i) real property classified as agricultural land
under section 273.13, subdivision 23, or the property is a homestead under

receivership to be converted to a limited receivership and a limited receivership to be converted to a
general receivership.” Id. This power allows a court to—on a case-by-case basis—convert ex-post
facto appointed receivers in mortgage foreclosures from the default limited receivership into a
general receivership, id., and thereby grant them the powers to sell the property, id. § 576.29, subd.
1(b)(5), and even to sell it free and clear of liens. Id. § 576.46, subd. 1(a).
108
It is unclear from the language of the statute whether the sale must be a public one or if it
may be conducted in the manner of selling property generally, by way of seeking out individual
buyers and/or using brokers. However, the absence of clear intent in the statute would lead towards
the conclusion a court may authorize any type of sale subject to MINN. STAT. § 576.46, subd. 1(b)
(2012), which gives the receiver the burden to prove the amount likely to be realized by the
objecting person from the sale is equal to or more than the objecting person would realize within a
reasonable time in the absence of the sale. Id. § 576.46, subd. 1(b).
109
Id. § 576.46, subd. 1(a).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Agreements to sell the property and circumvent
foreclosure proceedings are not clogs on the equity of redemption when agreed to after default. Id.
Under this statutory framework, not only is there a owner complaint system to ensure this agreement
to sell happened after default, there is the additional layer of defense: the requirement to go into
court to have the receiver converted from limited to general. MINN. STAT. § 576.24 (2014). With
these two safeguards in place the court can police receivership sales and ensure they are mutually
agreeable forms of maximizing value from the property and not clogs on the equity of redemption.
116
MINN. STAT. § 576.46, subd. 1(a)(1) (2014).
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section 510.01; and (ii) each of the owners of the property has not consented to
the sale following the time of appointment.”117
D. North Carolina
In North Carolina, a duly appointed receiver is given the power to sell
property as one of his enumerated powers.118 The statutory framework lays out
cases in which a receiver will be appointed.119 Mortgage foreclosures are not
explicitly mentioned,120 but, in all likelihood, they are covered by the General
Statutes of North Carolina section 1-502(1),121 which says a receiver may be
appointed:
Before judgment, on the application of either party, when he
establishes an apparent right to property[,] which is the subject of
the action and in the possession of an adverse party, and the property
or its rents and profits are in danger of being lost, or materially
injured or impaired; except in cases where judgment upon failure to

117

Id.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-505 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-507.2(4) (1955).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-502 (1981).
120
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-507.2(2) mentions a receiver’s ability to “[f]oreclose mortgages, deeds
of trust, and other liens executed to the corporation.” Id. Section 1-507.4 discusses foreclosure by
receivers and trustees of corporate mortgagees or grantees saying:
118
119

Where real estate has been conveyed by mortgage deed, or deed of trust to any
corporation in this [s]tate authorized to accept such conveyance for the purpose of
securing the notes or bonds of the grantor, and such corporation thereafter shall be
placed in the hands of a receiver or trustee in properly instituted court proceedings,
then such receiver or trustee under and pursuant to the orders and the decrees of the
said court or other court of competent jurisdiction may sell such real property
pursuant to the orders and the decrees of the said court or may foreclose and sell such
real property as provided in such mortgage deed, or deed of trust, pursuant to the
orders and decrees of such court.
All such sales shall be made as directed by the court in the cause in which said
receiver is appointed or the said trustee elected, and for the satisfaction and settlement
of such notes and bonds secured by such mortgage deed or deed of trust or in such
other actions for the sales of the said real property as the said receiver or trustee may
institute and all pursuant to the orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction
therein.
Id. However, these sections discuss the situation where a corporation has become insolvent
and the receiver is appointed to liquidate the corporation. Id. § 1-507.1. This is a different
circumstance than the case of a receiver simply maintaining the property during the pendency
of foreclosure proceedings. Moreover, the receiver in section 1-507.4 cannot sell the
mortgaged property; he must go through the full foreclosure proceedings under this section.
Id. § 1-507.4.
121
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-502
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answer may be had on application to the court.122
Therefore, when the property being foreclosed is losing equity, as often
can happen to a commercial property after default,123 the mortgagee can apply to
a court to appoint a receiver.124 Once the receiver has been appointed, the
district judge has the power to order the sale of the receivership property under
the terms that will best serve the affected creditors.125 Section 1-505 of the
General Statutes says to look to Article 29A of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes
for a more detailed discussion of the procedures used in judicial sales.126
Section 1-339.3A of that article says the “judge or clerk of court having
jurisdiction has authority in his discretion to determine whether a sale of either
real or personal property shall be a public or private sale.”127 The North
Carolina statutes are not clear as to whether the sale of the property can be made
free and clear of all liens or rights of redemption.
E. Ohio
The Ohio receivership statute is representative of many other states’
receivership statutes.128 There is a statute listing cases in which a receiver may
be appointed,129 including in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage by a
mortgagee where the property seems in danger of being “lost, removed, or
materially injured, or that the condition of the mortgage has not been performed,
and the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt.”130
However, with regards to the powers of a receiver, the statute simply states, “a
receiver may bring and defend actions in his own name as receiver, take and
keep possession of property, receive rents, collect, compound for, and
compromise demands, make transfers, and generally do such acts respecting the
property as the court authorizes.”131 The last clause of this statute is found in
many other states’ receivership statutes, albeit with somewhat different

122

Id.
After default, the commercial mortgagor may cease paying the mortgagee while diverting
rents and profits to his own pocket, effectively draining equity from the property, at least until an
assignment of rents clause is enforced. The mortgagor also has little incentive to maintain or repair
his property after foreclosure proceedings begin, and there is the danger the property will lose
significant value by the time of the sale.
124
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-502.
125
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-505 (1971).
126
Id.
127
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-339.3A (1997).
128
See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
129
OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.01 (West 2013).
130
Id. § 2735.01(B).
131
Id. § 2735.04.
123
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language.132 This clause, by its broad and general nature, seems to indicate a
legislative intent charging the courts with the final decision of what powers to
grant the receiver.
The Ohio court of appeals ruled in Director of Transportation v. Eastlake
Land Development Co.133 the trial court’s authorization of a receiver’s sale of a
parcel of land free and clear of liens was an error as a matter of law.134
However, that case did not turn on the power of receivers to sell land free and
clear of liens or the court’s ability to authorize such sales.135 The court of
appeals in Eastlake Land Development found the court had not properly notified
the affected lienholder;136 thus, the sale would have been a deprivation of his
due process rights.137 In Eastlake Land Development, the properties in question
were two vacant industrial parcels in Eastlake, Ohio.138 John Chiappetta
borrowed a total of $750,000 and secured the loans with three mortgages on his
two parcels of land.139 These mortgages were all later assigned to American
First Federal, Inc. (AFF).140 After taking out those loans against his property:
Eastlake Land Development Company, by and through its president,
John Chiappetta141 entered into a loan agreement and promissory
note with the [s]tate to fund development and construction on the
132

See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
Dir. Of Transp. v. Eastlake Land Dev. Co., 894 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
134
Id. at 1261.
135
In this case, the property was being sold free and clear of senior liens. Id. at 1258–59. The
general proposition to sell property free and clear of liens is the lienholder who has the ability to
wipe out junior liens at a proper foreclosure sale is attempting to wipe out those sell the property free
and clear of those junior liens that are inevitably going to be extinguished through a foreclosure sale.
There is an incentive for such a junior interest to allow the property to be sold free and clear of his
liens in the hopes such a sale will bring a higher value to the property and perhaps pay off more of
the debt owed to him than he would realize otherwise. See, e.g., supra note 109 and accompanying
text (stating the Minnesota free and clear sales statutes allows complaints to the sale if it can be
determined the amount likely to be realized from the sale by the objecting person is less than the
objecting person would realize within a reasonable time in the absence of this sale. Therefore, if a
junior lienholder wants to stop the free and clear sale by the senior lienholder he must demonstrate
he will gain more from a foreclosure sale. Because a foreclosure sale extinguishes the junior
lienholder’s rights, it will generally not be possible for a junior lienholder to lodge an allowable
complaint against the free and clear sale. By contrast, the senior lienholder will always be as well
off or better off if the junior lienholder does not conduct the free and clear sale and will almost
always be able to stop the sale free and clear of his lien.). In this case, however, the junior lienholder
was attempting to sell property free of a senior lien without giving due process to that senior interest,
and the court could easily find this receivership sale was invalid, even if the court was generally
agreeable to receivership sales free and clear of junior liens. Eastlake Land Dev., 894 N.E.2d at
1261.
136
Eastlake Land Dev., 894 N.E.2d at 1261.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1257.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 1258.
141
Id. at 1257–58.
133
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property.142 The city of Eastlake guaranteed the loan, which
[totaled] $2,425,000.143
. . . Eastlake Land Development Company defaulted on the loan[,
and] the State filed suit against Eastlake Land Development
Company and the city of Eastlake . . . .144
. . . The [s]tate also requested . . . a receiver . . . .
appointed [one].145

[T]he trial court

....
. . . [T]he receiver filed a request . . . to sell the second parcel. . . . .
146

. . . On January 30, 2007, the trial court entered an order setting the
receiver’s motion for hearing on February 13, 2007.147 Inexplicably,
however, on the same day, despite having set the receiver’s motion
for hearing, and without vacating its order setting the hearing, the
trial court entered an order granting the receiver’s request to sell the
second parcel . . . . 148
The court of appeals noted “[t]he record reflects that the receiver never
served AFF with a summons and complaint notifying AFF that he sought to
extinguish its interests through the sale of the property.”149 The court of appeals
did not focus on whether the trial court had the ability to authorize the receiver
to sell the second parcel free and clear of liens.150 Rather, the court stressed the
question was if the trial court had the power to authorize a receiver to “sell the
second parcel free and clear of AFF’s liens even though AFF had not consented
to the same and had not received notice that the property would be sold free of
its lien.”151 Once the threshold question was framed in this manner, it was easy
for the court of appeals to find “[t]he trial court’s order authorizing the receiver
to [sell the property free and clear of AFF’s lien] effectively resulted in a denial
of AFF’s due-process rights and, accordingly, was erroneous as a matter of
law.”152

142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. (after the first parcel had been sold over AFF’s objections).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1261.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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This case states this receiver’s sale of land free and clear of liens was
invalid, but it can be inferred, if the lienholder consented to the sale, perhaps it
would be in the power of the court to order such a receiver’s sale.153 This case
was unusual because the sale was being orchestrated by a junior lienholder
attempting to wipe out a senior lien that would have had priority in a proper
foreclosure proceeding. Therefore, the appellate court found the sale as an
attempt to circumvent due process rights.154 However, in a more standard
receiver setting, where the receiver is appointed to protect the senior lienholder’s
interests during the interim until the foreclosure sale, due process would not be
implicated, and perhaps this court would have reached a different result.155
In Huntington National Bank v. Motel 4 BAPS, Inc.,156 the Ohio Court of
Appeals said:
Ohio courts have held that “[Ohio Rev. Code Ann.] Chapter 2735,
‘does not contain any restrictions on what the court may authorize
when it issues orders regarding receivership property’, [and] . . . this
includes the power to authorize a receiver, under certain
circumstances, to sell property at a private sale free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances.”157
The mortgagor in Huntington National Bank appealed from the lower
court’s decision to confirm the receiver’s sale of the property after Motel 4
153
This case turned on whether the sale foreclosure of junior liens could wipe out senior
interests without notice, let alone consent, of that senior interest. Id. However, if there were no due
process concerns, the court may have come to a different conclusion. In this case, the majority
admitted freely they concurred with the dissent’s observation by saying:

[The dissent] can “find no Ohio case which holds that the only way to extinguish a
lienholder’s interest in a property is through a foreclosure action.” Nor can [the
majority]. However, the procedures mandated by foreclosure are more than statutory
“hoops” through which one must jump; they embody real concepts of due process.
Notice, opportunity to be heard, independent appraisal, and public sale are designed to
protect the interests of all parties; due process is a notion embedded in all court action.
Id. The majority did not rule there was no ability to have a receiver sell free and clear, it only ruled
in this specific case procedural flaws in the due process and notice requirements were so great as to
not require the case to be decided on the basis of a receiver’s powers to sell property free and clear
of liens. Id.
154
See id. (“The threshold question confronting us in this case is whether the trial court could
authorize the receiver to take the action he took, i.e., to sell the second parcel free and clear of AFF’s
liens even though AFF had not consented to [the] same and had not received notice that the property
would be sold free of its lien.”).
155
See id. (saying “a receiver's sale is subject to due-process requirements and review, and
failure to provide the same requires reversal and remand.” The implication is that the violation of
due process brought about the result in this case but not that the receivership arrangement generally
could not take similar actions if there were not any due process issues.).
156
Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Motel 4 BAPS, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 1210 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
157
Id. at 1213.
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defaulted on its loan.158 The mortgagor had filed a motion to stay the receiver’s
auction; it claimed, “the receiver [had] failed to provide Motel 4 notice of the
sale as required by [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section] 2329.26[,] and that the sale
constructively cut off Motel 4’s redemption rights.”159 The trial court conducted
a hearing and authorized the sale by the receiver.160 In beginning its review of
the case, the court of appeals declared, “[A] receiver is appointed for the benefit
of all the creditors of the property subject to receivership.”161 And, the receiver,
as an officer of the court, must act in accordance with what the court deems
appropriate.162 The court of appeals quoted the Ohio Supreme Court, saying it
“interpreted [Ohio Revised Code Annotated section] 2735.04 as ‘enabling the
trial court to exercise its sound judicial discretion to limit or expand a receiver’s
powers as it deems appropriate.’”163 The court of appeals said the standard by
which to judge a trial court’s orders to receivers is “a reviewing court will not
disturb the trial court’s judgment absent an abuse of discretion.”164 In this case,
the court of appeals did not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in
allowing a sale free and clear of liens by the receiver.165 Thus, the receiver’s
sale was confirmed.166
Another Ohio Court of Appeals case is worthy of note for its contribution
to the discussion of transfers of property made during the pendency of a
foreclosure without being a clog on the equity of redemption.167 In Panagouleas
Interiors, Inc. v. Silent Partner Group, Inc.,168 the court held the deed in lieu of
foreclosure at issue was invalid,169 and, “[f]urthermore, the ‘subsequent
agreement’ that can circumvent the prohibition against clogging typically occurs
only after default.”170
In 1993, Pete Panagouleas, a hotel owner specializing in hotel renovation,
purchased a hotel located at 330 West First Street,171 “To avoid foreclosure,

158

Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1211–12.
Id. at 1212.
161
Id. (quoting Castlebrook Ltd. v. Dayton Properties Ltd., 604 N.E.2d 808 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1214.
166
Id.
167
Note receivership sales are similar to other mortgage substitutes because they seek to alienate
the debtor’s property without resorting to the full foreclosure process. See NELSON ET AL., supra
note 1, at Chapter 3.
168
No. 18864, 2002 WL 441409 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
169
Id. at 12.
170
Id. at 11.
171
Id. at 1.
159
160
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Panagouleas agreed to sell the hotel to Anthony Corona.”172 Corona gave a
mortgage on the property to Panagouleas and Silent Partner Group (SPG), who
purchased the first mortgage from Panagouleas.173 The letter outlining the terms
of the mortgage agreement and the repayment information also provided: “The
funding of this loan will be simultaneously consummated with a contract, full
assignment of [n]ote and [m]ortgage and deed in lieu of foreclosure in
escrow.”174 The letter also stated:
[I]n the event of a default by Corona, Panagouleas will have [thirty]
days after the interest escrow of $91,458.36 has been depleted to
redeem the first mortgage and [d]eed in lieu of foreclosure. If
Panagouleas does not redeem the discharge of the [s]econd mortgage
will be recorded. The interest escrow will be drawn upon monthly.
However, if Corona should default, Panagouleas will be given notice
of the default. SPG will draw $7,621.53 monthly against the escrow
until it is depleted. Upon depletion of the escrow Panagouleas shall
have [thirty] days to redeem. If Panagouleas has not redeemed
within the [thirty] day period SPG will record the discharge.175
Corona defaulted on the SPG “[t]rust note and mortgage agreement almost
immediately.”176 Panagouleas was notified on the default, and his son Pete, who
himself was ill, “began to attempt to repurchase the note.”177 However, SPG did
not receive any funds by the time the grace period ran out,178 and
“[c]onsequently . . . recorded the deed in lieu of foreclosure.”179
Corona and Panagouleas Interiors, Inc. (PI), on whose behalf Panagouleas
signed the deed and mortgage, challenged the trial court’s finding upholding the
validity of the deed in lieu of foreclosure.180 PI claimed the deed in lieu of
foreclosure did not transfer legal and equitable title to SPG, and they were
required to use traditional foreclosure procedures because the deed in lieu of
foreclosure operated to deprive Pete Panagouleas and Anthony Corona of their
equity of redemption.181 The court quoted Shaw v. Walbridge,182 an old, yet still
controlling, Ohio Supreme Court case as saying:
There is no rule of law which prevents a mortgagor from disposing
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Shaw v. Walbridge, 33 Ohio St. 1 (Ohio 1877).
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of his equity of redemption to a mortgagee by private arrangement,
but courts of equity will not permit a mortgagee to take advantage of
his position so as to wrest from the mortgagor his equity, by an
unconscionable bargain.
The transaction will be jealously
scrutinized, but if the agreement is a fair one, under all the
circumstances of the case, it will be upheld.183
The court found the agreement cutting off the equity of redemption was
made contemporaneously—all the documents were determined to be part of the
same transaction—with the mortgage agreement, and “no agreement can be
made at the time of the mortgage, depriving the mortgagor of his right to
redeem.”184 The court pointed out “the ‘subsequent agreement’ that can
circumvent the prohibition against clogging typically occurs only after
default.”185
Panagouleas Interiors affirmed the courts’ stance on allowing transfers of
real property without the traditional mortgage foreclosure procedures when the
agreement to do so is made post-default.186 It can be inferred from the court’s
holding, when the agreement187 to transfer property not subject to traditional
rules is made post-default, it can circumvent the prohibition against clogging the
equity of redemption. This particular case dealt with clogs on the equity of
redemption that were presented in the form of deeds in lieu of foreclosure.188
However, a similar rationale should apply when the agreement circumventing
the prohibition against clogs on the equity of redemption is an agreement made
post-default appointing a receiver, and granting him the ability to sell the
property in any manner he determines is reasonably calculated to bring the
highest purchase price, if he determines a sale is the best course of action.
F. Washington
Washington statutes distinguish two types of receiverships: a general
receivership and a custodial receivership.189 One of the statutes states courts
183

Panagouleas Interiors, 2002 WL 441409, at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11 (quoting 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.44, at 37–305 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3 (1997)).
186
Id.
187
There may be a requirement for new consideration, such as extension of time to pay, for the
agreement to have legal weight. See id. (“Specifically, no new consideration flowed to Corona, who
was the party relinquishing the equity of redemption. Additionally, to the extent that the equity of
redemption belonged to Pete, no new consideration existed either, since these matters were all part
of the same transaction.”).
188
Id. at 1.
189
See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.005(10)-(11) (2004); Id. § 7.60.015 (differentiating the two
types of receivership: “A receiver must be either a general receiver or a custodial receiver. A
receiver must be a general receiver if the receiver is appointed to take possession and control of all
184
185
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should appoint a custodial receivership in cases where the sole basis for
appointment is the pendency of an action to foreclose upon a lien against the
property.190 Only general receivers are empowered to liquidate the receivership
property,191 while a custodial receiver cannot.192 However, if there are more
bases for appointing the receivership than simply the pendency of a foreclosure
action, perhaps a general receivership can be established.193 The Revised Code
of Washington section 7.60.025(1)(g), for example, says, “[W]hen the property .
. . [is] in danger of waste, impairment, or destruction, or where the abandoned
property’s owner has absconded with, secreted, or abandoned the property, and
it is necessary to collect, conserve, manage, control, or protect it, or to dispose
of it promptly,”194 there are grounds for a receivership to be appointed.195
Therefore, if there is a case of a pending foreclosure of a mortgage on a
commercial property that is quickly losing equity or depreciating in value, the
multiple bases may warrant a general receivership being appointed to liquidate
the property. Even if a custodial receivership is appointed, “[t]he court by order
may convert either a general receivership or a custodial receivership into the
other.”196
The Revised Code of Washington section 7.60.260(2) states court ordered
sales under this section be made free and clear of liens—the liens attach to the
proceeds of the sale—and all rights of redemption.197 The Washington statute
provides safeguards to owners and lienholders similar to those found in the
Minnesota statutes.198 There is a safeguard that shows a similar intent to
statutory redemption laws in mortgage, which grant residential mortgagors and
farmstead owners extra protection.199 There is also a complaint system that

or substantially all of a person’s property with authority to liquidate that property and, in the case of
a business over which the receiver is appointed, wind up affairs. A receiver must be a custodial
receiver if the receiver is appointed to take charge of limited or specific property of a person or is not
given authority to liquidate property.”).
190
Id. § 7.60.015.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
In section 7.60.015, the statute clearly states, “When the sole basis for the appointment is the
pendency of an action to foreclose upon a lien against real property . . . the court shall appoint the
receiver as a custodial receiver.” The legislative intent is not clear as to its treatment of cases in
which there are multiple bases for the appointment of a receiver and which only one of those bases is
the pendency of a foreclosure action.
194
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.025(1)(g) (2011).
195
Id.
196
Id. § 7.60.015.
197
Id. § 7.60.260(2) (“The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of estate property . . .
be effected free and clear of liens and of all rights of redemption, whether or not the sale will
generate proceeds sufficient to fully satisfy all claims secured by the property . . . . ”).
198
Id.
199
Id. § 7.60.260(2)(i) (stating sales free and clear of liens are allowed unless, “[t]he property is
real property used principally in the production of crops, livestock, or aquaculture, or the property is
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allows owners or parties with an interest in the property to file a timely
opposition to the sale.200 The court would then have to determine if the amount
likely to be realized by the objecting person from the receiver’s sale is less than
the person would realize within a reasonable time in the absence of the
receiver’s sale before proceeding with the sale.201
IV. A POSSIBLE UNIFORM FRAMEWORK
Real property has traditionally been treated differently than personal
property and is afforded the extra protection of equity of redemption and, in
some jurisdictions, statutory redemption. Therefore, legislatures have been
much quicker to pass laws for the execution of estates in a bankruptcy or the
sale of personal property in satisfying a judgment lien. However, in today’s
global economy, one company—such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac—buying
mortgages or deeds of trust on the secondary market may hold mortgages from
fifty different jurisdictions and subject to fifty different sets of laws. The system
can, therefore, be streamlined and become more efficient from any uniform laws
in the real property arena. Advocating for a nationally uniform foreclosure law
system is beyond the scope of this article.202 However, this article is suggesting
state statutes do more to address the rights and abilities of receivers. As it
presently stands, many states use a simple and general catch-all, such as
allowing receivers to “make transfers, and generally . . . do such acts respecting
the property as the court may authorize,”203 or “generally do such acts respecting
the property as the court authorizes.”204 These statutes leave much of the
decisions up to the court system. This, in turn, leads to more inefficiency,
because it is the inefficiencies of the court system—including two-year waiting
times for judicial foreclosure proceedings—which necessitates receiverships as
an ancillary remedy during the pendency of those actions. A bright line statute
clearly laying out a framework for what is expected of a receivership, and what
procedures and safeguards should be put in place in the case of sales of property
by the receiver, would minimize the toll on the court system by requiring at
most a review of the receiver’s transaction, as opposed to being intimately
a homestead under [WASH REV. CODE § 6.13.010(1)], and the owner of the property has not
consented to the sale following the appointment of the receiver . . . .”).
200
Id. § 7.60.260(2)(ii) (“The owner of the property or a creditor with an interest in the property
serves and files a timely opposition to the receiver’s sale, and the court determines that the amount
likely to be realized by the objecting person from the receiver’s sale is less than the person would
realize within a reasonable time in the absence of the receiver’s sale.”).
201
Id.
202
See generally supra note 42 (discussing, even where sweeping uniform foreclosure laws have
been introduced, they have not been adopted).
203
See supra note 46.
204
See supra note 47.
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involved at every step.
A uniform statute allowing receiver sales, especially sales free and clear of
liens, during a foreclosure proceeding would have to balance two sides. On one
hand, it would grant the receiver a measure of independent authority, which
would allow him to determine what type of sale to use or if a sale is the best
course of action at all. It would also incentivize the receiver to engage real
estate brokers to facilitate a possible sale. The other side of the scale would be
measures to ensure the sale does not clog the equity of redemption or obstruct
statutory rights of redemption. A state’s receivership sales statute could address
these concerns by requiring the choice or agreement to sell to be made after the
default by the mortgagor, either in court or in a private agreement by the parties.
It could also require court approval of a potential sale to ensure no foul play by
the receivers. These safeguards would ensure the ability to sell without resort to
a full foreclosure proceeding is not granted at the same time as the mortgage is
issued, which raises issues of possible clogs on the equity of redemption. The
rights of junior lienholders whose interests are subject to being extinguished by
way of the receiver’s free and clear sale should be granted the right to object to
the sale in a manner similar to the system discussed in the statutory frameworks
of both Minnesota and Washington.205
In addressing statutory rights of redemption where they apply, a sale could
be made subject to it, though that would reduce potential purchase prices. Or,
since those rights are statutory, a receiver sales statute could be made to be an
exception from the redemption right by the same body that instituted the right.
Alternatively, the receivership sales statutes could have built in exceptions for
the classes of people that statutory redemption is primarily aimed at helping
retain possession of their property—homestead and farmstead owners. The
blueprint for such an exception can be found in the statutory framework of
Minnesota and Washington. In Washington’s revised code section 7.60.260(2),
for example, it lays out the exceptions:
The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of estate property
either (a) under subsection (1) of this section, or (b) consisting of
real property which the debtor intended to sell in its ordinary course
of business be effected free and clear of liens and of all rights of
redemption, whether or not the sale will generate proceeds sufficient
to fully satisfy all claims secured by the property, unless either:
(i) The property is real property used principally in the production of
crops, livestock, or aquaculture, or the property is a homestead
205
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. “If a timely objection is filed, the court will
determine whether the amount likely to be realized from the sale by the objecting person is less than
the objecting person would realize within a reasonable time in the absence of this sale”. MINN.
STAT. § 576.461(a) (2014).
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under RCW 6.13.010(1), and the owner of the property has not
consented to the sale following the appointment of the receiver . . .
.206
Minnesota statutes section 576.46, subd. 1(a)(1) uses similar language:
The court may order that a general receiver’s sale of receivership
property is free and clear of all liens, except any lien for unpaid real
estate taxes or assessments and liens arising under federal law, and
may be free of the rights of redemption of the respondent if the
rights of redemption are receivership property and the rights of
redemption of the holders of any liens, regardless of whether the sale
will generate proceeds sufficient to fully satisfy all liens on the
property, unless either: (1) the property is (i) real property classified
as agricultural land under section 273.13, subdivision 23, or the
property is a homestead under section 510.01; and (ii) each of the
owners of the property has not consented to the sale following the
time of appointment . . . .207
For a receivership statute to increase efficiency and uniformity in the law,
and allow sales of real property free and clear of liens without infringing on any
traditional rights associated with real property, it would require three elements:
First, agreements allowing the receiver to sell the property must be agreed to by
the mortgagor post-default to avoid clogging the equity of redemption; second,
there must be an objection system that allows junior lienholders an opportunity
to prove they would receive more value if not for the proposed sale (any party
that feels the proposed sale price is too low can also employ this objection
system); and third, the statute should include the built in protections for
homestead and farmstead owners.208
V. CONCLUSION
This article discusses receiverships that arise during the pendency of a
foreclosure sale, be it through a judicial sale or a power of sale deed of trust in
the states in which they are available. The primary issue is the capture of as
much money as possible for the benefit of the mortgagee in a commercial
mortgage setting, where rents are accruing even after the mortgagor’s default.
206

WASH. REV. CODE § 7.60.260(2) (2011).
MINN. STAT. § 576.46, subd. 1(a)(1) (2012).
208
See infra Part I. The mortgages generally needing the protection afforded by a receiver’s
right to sell are non-recourse commercial mortgages wherein the mortgagee can lose equity rapidly
during the pendency of the sale. Id. Homestead and farmstead owners on the other hand, are the
mortgagors the protections of mortgage law were primarily developed to protect. Id. Furthermore,
homestead and farmstead owners are often at a bargaining disadvantage to large institutional
lenders—mortgagees. Thus, putting statutory protections in place to protect their interest stops
mortgagees from taking advantage of their weaker bargaining position.
207
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This article examines the statutory framework of a selection of states to
determine the extent of the receiver’s powers, with a specific eye towards his or
her power to sell the property and the limits regarding that power, if it exists at
all. Real property is an area of law that is very diverse and differs from state to
state. This article argues, however, in the modern world of commercial
mortgages, where the mortgagee is often an institutional lender with a multistate presence and even the mortgagors or at least their investors can span states,
there should be a trend towards uniformity in the law.

